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1Summary
Since its founding in January 2007, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
has continued the jihadi fi ght begun by its predecessor, the Salafi st Group for 
Preaching and Combat (GSPC), against the Algerian government. Algeria’s 
ability to contain the jihadis has forced AQIM to develop networks in the 
Sahara and to cooperate with smuggling rings there. Its mobile commandos, 
already active in Mauritania, now represent a serious security threat in northern 
parts of Mali and Niger, where they have abducted Westerners and frequently 
clashed with government forces.
Osama bin Laden appears to have no grand plans for Africa. But the 
Algerian-run AQIM could help al-Qaeda central incorporate a new generation 
of recruits from the Sahel. This jihadi progression south of the Sahara is 
limited, but troublesome, especially given a recent offer by AQIM’s leader to 
train Muslim militias in Nigeria.
However, the ethno-racial divide within al-Qaeda has kept African recruits 
out of leadership roles. AQIM cannot prove its commitment to “Africanized” 
jihad without Africanizing at least some of its leadership. Also, AQIM has 
partnered throughout the Sahel with criminals, not local salafi  movements, 
limiting its appeal and preventing it from becoming a revolutionary challenger. 
This does not mean deterring AQIM will be easy: Mauritania, Mali, and Niger 
are among the world’s poorest states and will require international support to 
defuse AQIM’s momentum. Algeria is right to push for regional cooperation 
to address the threat, and discreet aid from the West is crucial to help the Sahel 
countries regain control of their territory from al-Qaeda forces and prevent the 
terror group from taking hold in Africa.
Introduction
Recent terrorist activity across the Sahel raises the question of whether that 
region is a new theater for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and a 
land of opportunity for al-Qaeda central. Might the terror group transcend 
the Arab world, as it did in Afghanistan, and infl uence African Muslims? The 
sparsely populated and loosely patrolled borders of the Sahara are fertile ground 
for jihadi movements to grow unchecked. It is therefore feared that the Sahel 
could become an al-Qaeda safe haven and, more ominously, a launch pad for 
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attacks throughout Africa, home to roughly equal numbers of Christians and 
Muslims. But, no matter how troubling the scene in the Sahel is now, those 
long-term projections seem groundless so far. Terrorist networks linked to 
al-Qaeda operate in Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, but their roots are shallow; 
AQIM itself is weakened by deep internal rivalries. It is highly unlikely that al-
Qaeda’s future in the Sahel will mirror its past in Afghanistan, mainly because 
a strong ethnic divide persists inside jihadi networks.
The history of AQIM is important in understanding the challenges it faces 
in the Sahel. The organization was launched in January 2007 as the globally 
upgraded version of the Salafi st Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the 
most resilient jihadi faction in Algeria. The GSPC had an active branch in the 
Sahara, focusing mainly on Mauritania, but AQIM developed new networks 
by creatively cooperating with smuggling rings in the desert. Today highly 
mobile AQIM commandos seriously threaten security in northern Mali and 
northern Niger, where in recent years they have staged dramatic abductions of 
Western nationals and clashed frequently with government forces. The num-
ber of activists is small, but their actions are fueling international concern that 
al-Qaeda is breaking through in sub-Saharan Africa. Any assessment of this 
threat’s likelihood must consider the African record of Osama bin Laden and 
his associates.
Al-Qaeda’s African Experiences
A homogenous nucleus of Arab jihadis secretly founded al-Qaeda in Pakistan 
in August 1988. At fi rst the group took little notice of Africa, focusing on 
Afghanistan and the Arabian peninsula. Osama bin Laden, the group’s founder, 
grew incensed in August 1990 when the Saudis requested a massive U.S. mili-
tary deployment to deter the Iraqi threat in Kuwait. He was even angrier when 
American troops stayed in his country after Kuwait was liberated. 
This decision by the Saudi ruling family caused an irreconcilable rift 
between it and bin Laden. He was expelled to Pakistan in the spring of 1991, 
before moving to Sudan at the invitation of its Islamist dictatorship. Bin Laden 
settled in Khartoum in December 1991, where his main focus remained the 
Arabian peninsula; he reached out to Arab activists in Algeria, Egypt, or 
Yemen—not Somalia. 
That changed in the last weeks of 1992 as the United States launched 
Operation Restore Hope. That mission—a United Nations–sanctioned effort 
to protect international famine relief workers in Somalia—was portrayed 
by bin Laden as the U.S. equivalent of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
However, al-Qaeda’s fi rst attack against U.S. interests in the region targeted 
a luxury hotel in Aden, Yemen, where U.S. soldiers were staying en route to 
Somalia. This opening salvo was an operational disaster: No Americans were 
killed, and the only casualties were an Australian tourist, a local employee, 
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and the terrorists themselves. This attack showed that al-Qaeda had no inter-
est in Somalia itself, but was looking for a convenient pretext to strike at the 
“infi dels” on Arab soil—in this case, in Yemen. When al-Qaeda military 
commander Muhammad Atef moved into Somalia in 1993 to test training 
facilities, he faced considerable logistical problems, exacerbated by the local 
guerrillas’ xenophobia.
Al-Qaeda’s propaganda greatly exaggerated its contribution to the humili-
ation of U.S. troops in Mogadishu, epitomized by the “Black Hawk down” 
episode—the killing of eighteen American soldiers after a warlord’s militia 
shot down their helicopters in October 1993. Bin Laden’s aides were never 
truly welcome in Somalia. They were much more successful in establishing 
underground networks of support and intelligence in neighboring countries—
mainly Kenya, where African nationals such as the Comorian Fazul were fi rst 
promoted as ringleaders. Nevertheless, when Sudan expelled bin Laden in May 
1996 as a result of U.S. and Egyptian pressure, he did not opt for another 
African location. Instead he returned to Afghanistan, where his scant interest 
in African issues grew dimmer. His now-famous “declaration of jihad against 
America” broadcast in August 1996 mentioned fourteen battle fronts all over 
the world, but only three were in Africa: Somalia; Ogaden, the ethnically 
Somali and perennially rebellious eastern province of Ethiopia; and Eritrea, 
since al-Qaeda had built an enduring relationship with the Eritrean Islamic 
Jihad during bin Laden’s exile in Khartoum. Kenya and Tanzania were not 
mentioned, although they were the sites of major attacks on U.S. embassies in 
August 1998. The bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were not part of a 
strategic decision to move al-Qaeda into Africa; they occurred because Kenya 
and Tanzania were home to solid terror networks built over several years.
What remained of those networks struck again in Mombasa, Kenya, in 
November 2002, again acting more out of opportunism than a desire to estab-
lish al-Qaeda in Africa. The targets—a resort and a charter jet—were Israeli, 
but most of the casualties were Kenyan. This was the last straw for al-Qaeda 
in Kenya; the surviving operatives, a minority of them African, withdrew to 
southern Somalia. They developed a close relationship with the Shabab, a local 
salafi -jihadi militia that helped the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in its fi ght 
against the internationally backed transitional government. 
The ICU guerrillas took control of Mogadishu in the summer of 2006, 
provoking much alarm in the United States and at the United Nations. 
Washington supported an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006, 
hoping to oust the ICU from the capital and surrounding region. In the ensu-
ing confl ict, the Shabab fought alongside the ICU against the “infi del” aggres-
sion. Ethiopia withdrew its troops in January 2009, and ICU leader Sharif 
Sheikh Ahmed became the new Somali president. However, the Shabab turned 
against this “apostate” and “traitor”; bin Laden echoed these accusations, com-
paring Sharif Sheikh Ahmed to Afghan President Hamid Karzai and calling 
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for a full-fl edged “jihad” against his regime. The Shabab reciprocated by 
pledging allegiance to bin Laden in October 2009. Despite bin Laden’s public 
support for the Shabab, the militia was not incorporated into al-Qaeda. The 
terror organization’s three affi liates—al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in 
Iraq, and in the Islamic Maghreb—remain essentially Arab. 
The Focus on Mauritania
Mauritania is the only Arab country that is offi cially an Islamic Republic, but 
that is not the reason for al-Qaeda’s interest in it; rather, several infl uential fi g-
ures had ties to the country. During al-Qaeda’s “golden age” in Taliban-ruled 
Afghanistan (1996–2001), Mauritanian cleric Mahfouz Ould Walid (aka 
Abu Hafs al-Mauritani) was in charge of teaching classical Arabic to jihadi 
recruits in Kandahar, as well as imparting the usual ideological indoctrina-
tion. Abu Yahya al-Libi, a Libyan believed to have studied sharia and Islamic 
law in Nouakchott, Mauritania, is today the only top al-Qaeda leader with a 
theological background.
The most important link between al-Qaeda and Mauritania, however, was 
provided not by religious fi gures, but by Algerian activist Mokhtar Belmokhtar, 
sometimes called Belaouar (the “one-eyed”). Belmokhtar, born in 1972, 
claims to have fought in Afghanistan from 1991 to 1993, long after the end of 
Soviet occupation but amid the civil strife pitting the rival mujahidin factions 
against one another. Bin Laden was then living in Sudan, so it is hard to believe 
that Belmokhtar had signifi cant contact with the top al-Qaeda leadership in 
that period. His ties to al-Qaeda probably were established after he returned 
to Algeria as a 21-year-old “Afghan” veteran, joined the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) in its all-out war against the Algerian regime, and rose steadily through 
its ranks, surviving military raids and internal purges to become the GIA 
commander for the Sahara.
In 2000, Belmokhtar switched allegiance from the decaying GIA to the 
more promising GSPC, preserving most of his operational autonomy. He nur-
tured his relations with the desert tribes through marriage alliances and avoided 
extorting money from the local population, contrary to what the GSPC does in 
its Kabylia stronghold. To compensate for the loss of this revenue, Belmokhtar 
increasingly engaged in smuggling, earning the popular nickname “Mr. 
Marlboro.” But tobacco was certainly not his only trade; he also was involved 
in the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and illegal immigrants. The web of his 
criminal partnerships grew tighter in the vast area covering eastern Mauritania, 
northern Mali, and southwestern Algeria. Belmokhtar, a gifted survivor in 
the highly volatile world of jihadi guerrillas, consolidated safe havens in Mali 
and Algeria. He found it convenient to focus his violence against Mauritania, 
where President Ould Taya had established diplomatic relations with Israel 
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and supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq. In June 2005, Belmokhtar’s “bri-
gade,” or katîba, attacked a military outpost in the Mauritanian desert. He 
hailed the ensuing killing of a dozen soldiers as his own “Badr,” a reference to 
the Prophet Mohammed’s fi rst victory. (Jihadi propaganda described the April 
2007 AQIM triple suicide bombing in Algiers as “the Badr of the Maghreb.”)
Belmokhtar benefi ted greatly by leaving the GIA to join the GSPC. 
He endorsed Abdelmalik Drukdal as emir, or commander, of the GSPC 
and Belmokhtar’s infl uence rose in the Sahara under this new leadership. 
Belmokhtar also supported Drukdal’s pledge of allegiance to bin Laden, 
which helped launch AQIM and led to propaganda targeting France and other 
“Crusaders.” As a tribute to this new global agenda, some of Belmokhtar’s 
followers murdered four French tourists near Aleg, Mauritania, in December 
2007. They used their trans-Saharan connections to escape to Bissau, where 
they were arrested. The violence did not end there: Belmokhtar ordered the 
drive-by shooting in front of the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, 
in February 2008. When General Abdel Aziz toppled Mauritania’s democratic 
regime in August 2008, AQIM declared jihad against the Islamic Republic 
of Mauritania, which it labeled “apostate.” Belmokhtar’s followers and the 
Mauritanian security forces skirmished in the Sahara several times.
AQIM’s aggression was not stemmed when the rule of law was restored 
following the July 2009 elections. Mauritania remained the safest ground for 
Belmokhtar to try to earn “global jihadi” credentials. During the summer of 
2009, AQIM murdered a U.S. citizen in Nouakchott, and a suicide bomber 
died in a failed attack on the French embassy there. 
Turf Wars in Mali
Belmokhtar supported Drukdal as emir of the GSPC and endorsed Drukdal’s 
ties to al-Qaeda, but relations between the two have been strained, leading to 
a veritable turf war in Mali. Both Drukdal, born in 1970, and Belmokhtar 
are talented survivors in the extremely brutal underworld of Algerian jihad-
ism. Each wrongly has been reported dead several times; each returned with 
renewed stamina. Drukdal is based in distant Kabylia, east of Algiers on the 
Mediterranean coast; he is challenged to assert his leadership over Belmokhtar 
and his katîba. Belmokhtar has gained notoriety and international visibility 
through his ties to AQIM; he contributes large sums of ransom money to 
AQIM’s overall budget. His growing reputation has escalated tensions between 
himself and Drukdal.
Drukdal feared Belmokhtar was becoming too powerful and promoted 
another fi eld commander in the Sahara, Abdelhamid (Hamidu) Abu Zeid, 
whose katîba roamed the desert east of Belmokhtar’s turf. The two katîba com-
manders were formally placed under the control of Yahya Djouadi, a Drukdal 
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representative in southern Algeria. This clarifi ed the AQIM chain of com-
mand, but tensions kept brewing between Belmokhtar and Abu Zeid.
The showdown occurred in Mali, which Belmokhtar considered a safe haven 
for his attacks on Mauritania. AQIM hostages often were released in Mali 
after protracted negotiations—a process that had become practically routine. 
But that routine was violated on May 31, 2009, when Abu Zeid ordered the 
execution of a British tourist captured four months before. Malian authorities 
reacted by capturing some AQIM operatives and Abu Zeid retaliated on June 
11, 2009, sending a hit squad to kill a senior Malian intelligence offi cer in his 
Timbuktu home. 
This killing came as an unprecedented blow to President Amadou Toumani 
Touré, who was fi rst elected in a democratic contest in 2002 and re-elected 
in 2007 with more than two-thirds of the vote. In 2006 he had placated the 
Touareg insurgency through an Algerian-sponsored peace process; now he 
faced a new threat in AQIM. Touré responded forcefully, sending his army 
after the jihadi commandos in northern Mali. Heavy clashes in July 2009 
killed dozens of fi ghters.
Belmokhtar’s katîba withdrew into the Tanezrouft range, on Algerian soil, 
subduing him and strengthening Drukdal. But the AQIM emir could not go 
too far in weakening Belmokhtar; after all, Drukdal wanted to keep open the 
option, no matter how remote, to leave his besieged stronghold in Kabylia to 
relocate to the Sahara. Belmokhtar and Abu Zeid grew more competitive, each 
exhorting his network to deliver new Western hostages and triggering a wave of 
kidnappings during the last months of 2009. Three Spaniards were caught on 
the Mauritanian coastal road. An Italian couple was captured in Mauritania 
near the Malian border. A French national, and longtime humanitarian worker 
in northern Mali was kidnapped in the eastern town of Menaka. He was freed 
in February 2010, and the Italian couple was released two months later. But 
the incident marred Mali’s reputation for stability and effectively closed the 
region of Timbuktu and its historical sites to international visitors. AQIM’s 
actions dealt a similar blow to desert-trekking tourism in Mauritania. The 
area’s nascent tourism industry suffered a deep crisis, and a key source of 
much-needed hard currencies dried up.
Niger Much More Than Nigeria
Until recently, the major threat to stability in Niger has come from Touareg 
movements, not from al-Qaeda. President Mamadou Tandja, in charge since 
1999, dealt with the Touareg rebels fi rst through military repression, then 
through a political dialogue sponsored by Libya. AQIM became a major secu-
rity threat in December 2008 when Abu Zeid’s katîba, eager to carve up a terri-
tory of its own and challenge Belmokhtar’s “global” credentials, abducted two 
Canadian nationals: the UN special envoy to Niger and his aide. Both were 
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released four months later, but the kidnappings opened an era of confrontation 
between AQIM and Niger’s security forces.
The situation in Niger worsened during the winter of 2009–2010, as 
Tandja resolved to stay in power beyond the end of his term despite interna-
tional consensus. A military junta took power in February 2010 and appointed 
Mahamadou Danda to lead a transitional government that vows to restore the 
democratic process in the near future. Military units continue to clash with 
AQIM commandos in northern Niger, where a French national was abducted in 
April 2010 (his Algerian driver was detained only a week before being released).
Although Mauritania, Mali, and Niger have so far been the main, though 
limited, areas of operations for AQIM in the Sahel, Drukdal has made one 
prominent attempt to open one more theater in Africa. By doing so, he has 
only added to his record of “global” provocations, with few operational conse-
quences. For example, in January 2009 during the Israeli offensive on Gaza, he 
had echoed bin Laden’s call for retaliation against “the Jews and the Crusaders” 
worldwide. In July 2009, after the repression of the Muslim riots in Xinjiang, 
he pledged to take revenge on Chinese workers in Algeria, even though none of 
them was subsequently hurt. In January 2010, he chose at last an African cause, 
offering to “train” Nigerian volunteers against the “Crusade” waged by their 
Christian compatriots and to arm them in a Somali-style “jihad.” This bom-
bastic call triggered no reaction in Nigeria. But it struck a chord in the inter-
national media, because Umar Faruk Abdulmutalab, a young Nigerian trained 
by al-Qaeda, had tried to blow up an airliner near Detroit on Christmas Day 
2009. Abdulmutalab had been recruited in Yemen, not Nigeria, and sectarian 
violence in the central Nigerian province of Jos is fueled locally, not imported. 
But Drukdal’s offer nurtured the perception that Nigeria had moved to the top 
of al-Qaeda’s agenda. The fear that AQIM could achieve substantial inroads in 
Nigeria and, more generally, around the Gulf of Guinea, grew. This is why the 
regional threat must be assessed carefully.
Assessing the Threat
Any measurement of the threat AQIM poses to the countries of the Sahel must 
weigh its capacity to use force, appeal to the population, and ability to establish 
deep political roots. By and large, AQIM poses more of a security threat than 
a political one.
Although AQIM has only few hundred members scattered across the Sahara 
(reasonable estimates put both Belmokhtar’s katîba and that of Abu Zeid at 
200 to 300 men), that low number is misleading. These forces are taking 
advantage of a relative security vacuum in the Sahel. As the table below indi-
cates, the military budgets of Mali, Niger, and Mauritania are a fraction of 
those of Algeria and Libya. In 2009 Mali’s military budget was the largest in 
the Sahel at $180 million; Algeria’s military budget was $5.3 billion. Countries 
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north of the Sahara also yield soft power, with Algeria and Libya sponsoring 
peace processes with local insurgencies in Mali and Niger, respectively. But in 
the Sahel countries the security forces, no matter how strongly motivated, are 
ill-equipped to chase and fi ght AQIM commandos in vast and scarcely popu-
lated areas. The priority should be to enable the armed forces in Mauritania, 
Mali, and Niger to regain control over the large parts of their territory now 
off-limits for foreigners, because of the risk of AQIM kidnappings and attacks. 
AQIM is challenging the armed forces of the Sahel countries, but its iso-
lation saps its political potential. In the Islamic Republic of Mauritania—as 
Government Forces in the Sahel Region
Country
Military budget (in million $)
Military Forces
2008 2009
ALGERIA 5,170 5,300
Army: 127,000 (1,082 tanks)
Navy: 6,000
Air Force: 14,000 (197 planes)
Total: 147,000 (18-month draft) 
BURKINA FASO 111 123
Army: 6,400
Gendarmerie: 4,200
Air Force: 600 
Total: 11,200
CHAD 145 151
Army: 20,000 (60 tanks)
Republican Guard: 5,000
Air Force: 350 (6 planes)
Total: 25,350
LIBYA 800
Army: 50,000 (2,205 tanks)
Navy: 8,000
Air Force: 18,000 (374 planes)
Total: 76,000 
MALI 156 180
Army: 7,350 (33 tanks)
Air Force: 400 (13 planes)
Total: 7,750 
MAURITANIA 20
Army: 15,000 (35 tanks)
Navy: 620 
Air Force: 250 
Total: 15,870 
NIGER 58 67
Army: 5,200 
Air Force: 100
Total: 5,300 (24-month draft)
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies)
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well as in Mali or Niger, where more than 90 percent of the population is 
Muslim—AQIM does not cooperate with local salafi  movements, which are 
themselves isolated in an Islamic environment deeply infl uenced by Sufi sm. 
Nor does AQIM work with the local insurgents, who turned against it in Chad 
in 2004 and in Mali in 2006. In the Sahara AQIM basically cooperates only 
with delinquent smuggling networks. Criminal exchanges—hostages for cash, 
drugs for weapons, and intelligence-sharing—are crucial to its survival and 
operation. This generates an image problem for a self-proclaimed jihadi orga-
nization; Belmokhtar’s 2008 decision to declare jihad against the Mauritanian 
regime was in part an effort to live down his reputation as simply being “Mr. 
Marlboro.” In the same spirit, Drukdal decided to up the ante in January 2010, 
while celebrating the third anniversary of AQIM and offering his support to 
the Nigerian “brothers.” 
AQIM’s criminal dimension hurts it in winning political support, particu-
larly with religiously inclined groups, but it is important to the organization’s 
operations. The Sahel countries are among the poorest on the planet. Annual 
GDP per capita is $1,042 in Mauritania, $657 in Mali, and $390 in Niger, 
which ranks last among the 182 states in the United Nations Development 
Programme’s classifi cation of human development. (Neither Mauritania nor 
Mali fare dramatically better; Mauritania ranks 154th and Mali 178th.) AQIM 
can afford low-intensity guerrilla activity in such an environment only because 
the partnership in crime provides a steady fl ow of recruits, no matter how low 
their jihadi commitment.
AQIM typically releases its hostages through tribal leaders with “busi-
ness” connections, not through political go-betweens. The notable excep-
tion came in March 2010, when a Mauritanian dissident who became an 
adviser to Burkina-Faso’s president arranged the release of a Spanish detainee 
in Ouagadougou, where the adviser now lives. Even that case, however, was 
far from political: AQIM covered up the deal by pretending that the hostage 
had converted to Islam.
These examples show that AQIM is a security threat, not a political threat. 
Drukdal’s organization did hijack the nascent tourism industry in Mali, a 
country often praised for its democratic record, but AQIM has intensifi ed 
its violence in Mauritania and Niger after military coups. Clearly a country’s 
political structure is unrelated to al-Qaeda’s use of violence there. AQIM 
is at the end of the day an opportunistic network, whose aggressiveness is 
largely fuelled by the rivalry between its two fi eld commanders in the Sahara, 
Belmokhtar and Abu Zeid. 
Government forces must be empowered to contain and eventually roll back 
the jihadi commandos. Regional cooperation between neighboring coun-
tries is key to disrupting AQIM’s mobility and Algeria has long been push-
ing for such trans-Saharan cooperation. Algeria’s military maintains pressure 
on Drukdal and the AQIM leadership in their Kabylian stronghold. The 
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possibility of Drukdal and the AQIM leadership escaping southward further 
raises the stakes for Algeria. This is why the Algerian city of Tamanrasset 
recently became the seat of a regional military command, where Mali, 
Mauritania, and Niger cooperate with Algeria.
An assessment of the threat could not be complete without taking into con-
sideration the vision of al-Qaeda central. Bin Laden and his associates have 
been deeply frustrated by AQIM’s handling of the abductions, which have 
resulted in only one hostage execution. Al-Qaeda central is very interested in 
the enrollment of sub-Saharan Africans in the two desert katîba. The fi gures 
are still very limited: a handful of individuals, perhaps a few groups of men, but 
nothing anyone could call an organized cell. Very little is known about what 
those trained jihadis will do when they are smuggled back home. This is where 
the long-term threat could be the strongest: Al-Qaeda central probably will 
refuse to incorporate a Somali militia such as the Shabab, but would accept the 
partial “Africanization” of AQIM’s rank-and-fi le so long as Algerians remain 
in charge.
Both al-Qaeda central and AQIM have a vested interest in reviving the 
jihadi dialectics of the “far enemy” and the “near enemy” in the Sahara. 
Western countries are the “far enemy,” tactically targeted for harder and deeper 
strikes than the “near enemy,” the local regimes and the populations who sup-
port them. AQIM has long lost the dream of defeating, or even weakening, 
Algerian state power; even the much more vulnerable regimes in the Sahel 
are far from its reach. Provoking the “far enemy” and stirring direct U.S. or 
European intervention could create an environment that enables AQIM to 
endure and expand. 
Western powers must consider this jihadi gamble when planning the coun-
terterrorism support that Saharan states desperately need, because any public 
display of Western might plays into the hands of AQIM. Drukdal’s networks 
are bound to continue provoking the international community by kidnap-
ping Western nationals and striking high-visibility targets. The governments 
of the Sahel can prevent al-Qaeda from taking hold in their region as it did in 
Afghanistan—if they cooperate and are the core actors while receiving discreet 
international support. 
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